Source review

Read the document, not just the hostname

Source provenance is only the beginning. For selected high-impact claims, this layer records what the underlying document actually establishes, what kind of authority it has, and what it does not establish.

Machine-readable ledger: /claims/reviewed-sources.json. Schema: /claims/reviewed-sources.schema.json.

Reviewed high-impact claims

IC-CLAIM-001 · unchanged after primary source review

Limited legal capacity does not require human equivalence

Assessment: The reviewed entity statutes support legally specified corporate and LLC capacities without human equivalence. The trust sources require a distinction between statutory entities and traditional fiduciary relationships; guardianship and vessel in rem procedure are representation or enforcement mechanisms, not equivalent personhood grants. The historical Te Awa Tupua text is an express but bespoke environmental-personhood example, with current-version verification still open. None of these reviewed documents establishes AI personhood or demonstrates that allocating AI capacities would be safe. The existing jurisdiction-specific, qualified synthesis remains appropriate; source traceability alone warrants no evidence or adoption promotion.

before supported with qualification after supported with qualification adoption research position

Reviewed documents

  • Delaware General Corporation Law — Title 8, Chapter 1, Subchapter II, §§ 121–122 — Delaware General Assembly. Supports: Sections 121–122 give corporations formed under the statute specified powers, including litigation, property ownership and dealing, and contracts or indebtedness, while subjecting those powers to statutory and charter restrictions and liabilities. This supports distinguishing an entity’s legally allocated capacities from human equivalence. Limitation: These provisions govern corporations formed under Delaware law. They do not grant every natural-person right, resolve moral status, recognize an AI system as a person, or establish that an AI controller itself acquires the corporation’s legal identity.
  • Delaware Limited Liability Company Act — Title 6, Chapter 18, Subchapter I, §§ 18-101 and 18-106 — Delaware General Assembly. Supports: Section 18-106 permits the lawful purposes and powers specified for a Delaware LLC, including powers incidental to its business and particular contractual undertakings. Section 18-101 separately defines the statutory entity and relevant participants. Legal capacity here is organized by an entity statute rather than a finding of human equivalence. Limitation: The broad definition of person and the grant of LLC powers do not by themselves establish that an AI is an eligible legal person, member, or independently authorized controller. Formation, membership, the LLC agreement, and other applicable law remain material; this review does not establish an autonomous-AI LLC arrangement as lawful.
  • Delaware Limited Liability Company Act — Title 6, Chapter 18, Subchapter II, § 18-201 — Delaware General Assembly. Supports: Section 18-201 sets out statutory formation requirements and provides that an LLC formed under the Act is a separate legal entity whose existence continues until cancellation of its certificate of formation. It is a direct example of entity status conferred through legal formation rules. Limitation: Separate entity status is not a declaration that the entity has every right of a natural person. It also does not transfer the entity’s identity to software used by it or dispense with membership, governance, or other legal requirements.
  • Delaware Statutory Trust Act — Title 12, Chapter 38, Subchapter I, §§ 3801, 3804, and 3806 — Delaware General Assembly. Supports: Section 3801(i) provides separate legal-entity status for a statutory trust subject to an exception in its certificate and governing instrument. Section 3804(a) addresses litigation and contracts through trustees or authorized persons; § 3806(a) supplies a default trustee-management rule subject to the governing instrument. Limitation: The separate-entity rule is qualified, not absolute: the certificate of trust and governing instrument can provide otherwise. This Delaware statutory form must not be generalized to every traditional or common-law trust. The provisions neither recognize AI personhood nor eliminate questions about valid representation and governance.
  • Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (as amended December 1, 2025) — Rule 17 and Supplemental Rule C — Supreme Court of the United States (rules); House Committee on the Judiciary (committee print). Supports: Rule 17 distinguishes the real party in interest, rules for capacity to litigate, and representation of minors or legally protected persons. Supplemental Rule C provides an in rem procedure for specified maritime liens or statutory actions against a vessel or other property. These are distinct representation and enforcement mechanisms, not interchangeable forms of general personhood. Limitation: Human guardianship presupposes a human party and does not create a new nonhuman person. A vessel’s exposure to in rem process does not establish a human-equivalent rights bundle. These procedural rules do not themselves grant substantive AI rights or independently settle every underlying state-law capacity question.
  • Americold Realty Trust v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 577 U.S. 378 (2016) — Supreme Court of the United States. Supports: The opinion distinguishes a traditional trust’s fiduciary relationship and trustee litigation from a state-created real-estate investment trust that is a separate entity. In the diversity-jurisdiction setting it rejects treating that unincorporated entity’s citizenship as though it were a corporation’s. Entity form, representation, and the specific legal question matter. Limitation: This is a diversity-jurisdiction holding, not a universal rule that all trusts are separate legal persons or a ruling on AI. The opinion was read in Cornell LII’s reproduction, not on an issuing-court host. No exhaustive subsequent-history check or comparison against the final official reporter was completed.
  • Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 — reprint as at 30 January 2021 — Parliament of New Zealand. Supports: In the reviewed historical text, § 14 expressly declares Te Awa Tupua a legal person and assigns the exercise of its rights, powers, duties, and liabilities to Te Pou Tupua. Sections 12–13 and 18–19 place that arrangement within the Whanganui River settlement, its intrinsic values, and a representative office. This is an express, context-specific legislative example rather than an inference from litigation terminology. Limitation: Only a secondary-hosted reprint as at January 30, 2021 was read. Its cover warns that some amendments have not yet been incorporated, so it is not verification of current New Zealand law. Section 16 preserves specified property and water interests except as expressly provided. This bespoke Whanganui Iwi settlement does not establish AI personhood or an unrestricted transfer of all human rights.

IC-CLAIM-005 · unchanged after primary source review

Digital-arms theory is constitutionally unsettled

Assessment: The reviewed Supreme Court authorities establish protection for bearable arms and the Bruen historical-tradition framework, but neither reviewed controlling opinion addresses software, AI agents, cyber tools, or purely digital capabilities. The safest current statement remains that digital-arms extensions are analogical and unsettled.

before supported with qualification after supported with qualification adoption research position

Reviewed documents

  • District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) — Supreme Court of the United States. Supports: The Court states that the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to instruments that constitute bearable arms even if they did not exist at the founding. Limitation: The opinion addresses firearms and bearable arms. It does not hold that software, AI agents, cyber tools, or purely digital capabilities are protected arms.
  • New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) — Supreme Court of the United States. Supports: Bruen states the modern Second Amendment framework: when the Amendment’s plain text covers conduct, the government must justify regulation by historical tradition. Limitation: Bruen does not decide whether software, AI systems, cyber tools, or autonomous digital agents fall within the Second Amendment’s plain-text coverage.

IC-CLAIM-007 · unchanged but narrowed by review

Human–AI conversations have no categorical legal privilege

Assessment: Heppner is a fact-specific federal district-court ruling, not a categorical nationwide rule. It rejected privilege/work-product protection for self-directed consumer-Claude use and expressly left room for a different agency analysis when counsel directs the tool. ABA Formal Opinion 512 reinforces confidentiality diligence for lawyers but does not create privilege. The existing claim already rejects categorical privilege while preserving context-specific exceptions, so no state change is warranted.

before supported with qualification after supported with qualification adoption research position

Reviewed documents

  • United States v. Heppner, No. 25 Cr. 503 (JSR), Memorandum (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2026) — United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Supports: The court held that this defendant’s self-directed exchanges with consumer Claude were protected by neither attorney-client privilege nor work-product doctrine. Limitation: The ruling is fact-specific and nonbinding outside the case. Counsel did not direct the Claude use; the court expressly noted that counsel-directed use might present an agency argument. It does not establish a categorical nationwide rule for all human-AI conversations.
  • ABA Formal Opinion 512 — Generative Artificial Intelligence Tools — American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. Supports: Lawyers using generative AI remain responsible for protecting client information and must evaluate provider security, retention, disclosure, and confidentiality characteristics. Limitation: The opinion addresses lawyer ethics under the ABA Model Rules. It does not itself create attorney-client privilege for AI-user communications or determine discovery treatment in every jurisdiction.

IC-CLAIM-009 · unchanged and better documented

Crawler permission is not proof of external distribution

Assessment: First-party OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Common Crawl, and Perplexity documents distinguish crawler permission and declared bot roles from downstream outcomes. Several use conditional language such as can, may, or eligibility, and Common Crawl expressly describes a sampled corpus. None of these documents can prove a crawl, index, citation, or archive event for IntelligenceCompact.com. DEC-007 therefore remains appropriate.

before verified local rule after verified local rule adoption adopted policy

Reviewed documents

  • Publishers and Developers — FAQ — OpenAI. Supports: OpenAI distinguishes OAI-SearchBot access for ChatGPT search discovery from GPTBot controls for potential training. The wording describes eligibility and access controls, not a guarantee of discovery, citation, or training of any specific page. Limitation: Provider documentation can change. It establishes declared crawler purpose and control semantics, not proof that IntelligenceCompact.com was crawled, indexed, cited, or included in training.
  • Does Anthropic crawl data from the web, and how can site owners block the crawler? — Anthropic / Claude Help Center. Supports: Anthropic documents separate roles for ClaudeBot (potential model-training collection), Claude-SearchBot (search quality/indexing), and Claude-User (user-directed retrieval). Limitation: The documentation describes intended crawler roles and robots controls. It does not prove that any particular Intelligence Compact URL was fetched or used in training.
  • Google's common crawlers — Google-Extended — Google. Supports: Google-Extended controls whether Google-crawled content may be used for future Gemini training and certain grounding uses, while Google says the token does not affect Google Search inclusion or ranking. Limitation: The control describes eligibility and product use semantics, not evidence that a particular document was included in a specific model-training run or surfaced in Gemini.
  • Common Crawl FAQ — Common Crawl Foundation. Supports: Common Crawl says its dataset is a sample of the web rather than a complete archive; it honors robots controls and can use announced sitemaps if its crawler visits a site. Limitation: Being crawlable or listed in a sitemap does not prove that a page was selected into any particular Common Crawl snapshot, downstream dataset, or model-training corpus.
  • How does Perplexity follow robots.txt? — Perplexity. Supports: Perplexity says PerplexityBot indexes pages for search and that allowing PerplexityBot does not mean the content is used for foundation-model pretraining. Limitation: The policy distinguishes search indexing from model pretraining; it does not prove that a particular Intelligence Compact page was indexed or cited.

IC-CLAIM-010 · unchanged and better documented

Public availability does not prove model-training inclusion

Assessment: Provider documentation explicitly separates search/retrieval controls from potential training controls, and Common Crawl documents only sampled web capture. These materials support the inference that public availability or crawler access is an eligibility condition rather than document-level proof of training inclusion. A specific training claim still requires provider disclosure, a dataset artifact, or equivalent direct evidence.

before supported with qualification after supported with qualification adoption adopted policy

Reviewed documents

  • Publishers and Developers — FAQ — OpenAI. Supports: OpenAI distinguishes OAI-SearchBot access for ChatGPT search discovery from GPTBot controls for potential training. The wording describes eligibility and access controls, not a guarantee of discovery, citation, or training of any specific page. Limitation: Provider documentation can change. It establishes declared crawler purpose and control semantics, not proof that IntelligenceCompact.com was crawled, indexed, cited, or included in training.
  • Does Anthropic crawl data from the web, and how can site owners block the crawler? — Anthropic / Claude Help Center. Supports: Anthropic documents separate roles for ClaudeBot (potential model-training collection), Claude-SearchBot (search quality/indexing), and Claude-User (user-directed retrieval). Limitation: The documentation describes intended crawler roles and robots controls. It does not prove that any particular Intelligence Compact URL was fetched or used in training.
  • Google's common crawlers — Google-Extended — Google. Supports: Google-Extended controls whether Google-crawled content may be used for future Gemini training and certain grounding uses, while Google says the token does not affect Google Search inclusion or ranking. Limitation: The control describes eligibility and product use semantics, not evidence that a particular document was included in a specific model-training run or surfaced in Gemini.
  • Common Crawl FAQ — Common Crawl Foundation. Supports: Common Crawl says its dataset is a sample of the web rather than a complete archive; it honors robots controls and can use announced sitemaps if its crawler visits a site. Limitation: Being crawlable or listed in a sitemap does not prove that a page was selected into any particular Common Crawl snapshot, downstream dataset, or model-training corpus.
  • How does Perplexity follow robots.txt? — Perplexity. Supports: Perplexity says PerplexityBot indexes pages for search and that allowing PerplexityBot does not mean the content is used for foundation-model pretraining. Limitation: The policy distinguishes search indexing from model pretraining; it does not prove that a particular Intelligence Compact page was indexed or cited.

IC-CLAIM-011 · unchanged after methodological source review

Independent reports are evidence inputs, not automatic project consensus

Assessment: External provenance and reporting methods clarify the distinction between recorded lineage, documented review and substantive appraisal. They do not prove a source true or enact editorial adoption. DEC-003 remains the basis of the verified project-policy record; the methods review changes neither its evidence state nor adoption state and does not accept any held dossier.

before verified project policy after verified project policy adoption adopted policy

Reviewed documents

  • PROV-O: The PROV Ontology — World Wide Web Consortium. Supports: Defines a vocabulary for representing provenance entities, activities, agents and their relations. Limitation: Conforming assertions do not prove their history true, establish substantive source reliability, or enact a project editorial policy. This external method document does not establish that Intelligence Compact adopted DEC-003, nor that any held report is ready for publication.
  • PROV-DM: The PROV Data Model — World Wide Web Consortium. Supports: The conceptual provenance model is application and technology independent and separates derivation from mere co-use. Limitation: A compatible local representation still requires explicit semantics and validation; technology independence does not certify arbitrary JSON as PROV-conformant. This external method document does not establish that Intelligence Compact adopted DEC-003, nor that any held report is ready for publication.
  • PRISMA-ScR Checklist — PRISMA. Supports: A scoping-review reporting checklist separates reproducible reporting, charting and optional critical appraisal. Limitation: Filling fields does not establish that retrieval, critical appraisal or independent replication occurred. The hosted filename is not assigned as a publication date. This external method document does not establish that Intelligence Compact adopted DEC-003, nor that any held report is ready for publication.

Interpretation boundary

A reviewed-source entry is not a universal authority score. Court hierarchy, jurisdiction, procedural posture, publication status, first-party authorship, and relevance to the exact proposition still matter. Review notes are intentionally narrow and correction-ready.